National Underground Asset Register : assessment of additional use cases - resilience planning by Freeborough, Katy & Bricker, Stephanie
1
National Underground Asset Register 
Assessment of additional Use Cases – Resilience Planning
September 2021
OR/21/048
Use case prepared by:
Katy Freeborough1 and Stephanie Bricker1 on behalf of the Project Iceberg Committee









I am a government planner in London. 
It’s my job to identify critical and 
vulnerable infrastructure. 
I need to better understand criticality and risk to inform our 
emergency, security and disaster response planning. Flooding and 



























• Buried utility infrastructure must be resilient to shocks (notably floods and blasts/collapse) and stresses (notably corrosion and ground
motion).
• The costs to the utility sector associated with these hazards are significant - corrosion (4-5% of GDP); ground movement (£300-500m/yr);
flood impacts to water/energy infrastructure typically ~3-10% of the total flood event cost.
• Multi-hazard and multi-utility impact assessment is essential for resilience planning but requires collaboration and data sharing by a number
of government and non- government organisations in addition to the utility sector.
• Combining NUAR data and other datasets would enable multi-factor scenario modelling or ‘Digital Rehearsing’ for many events. However key
baseline data can be difficult to access, subject to licences or security restrictions or in some cases unavailable. This results in valuable
information for resilience modelling being excluded from the risk analysis. NUAR itself needs to be embedded within the underground asset
and construction sectors to reach a level of data maturity that provides sufficient data coverage to ensure its effectiveness.
• Improved collection and sharing of subsurface asset information via NUAR (e.g. asset condition/proximity to other assets/material type)
offers the opportunity to formalise access to standardised data, in a structured format to greatly assist the future of resilience planning for
critical infrastructure.
• Effective resilience planning requires robust processes, not just access to data. Recent resilience-based collaborative projects have focused on
better ‘process’ i.e. Building understanding of e.g. ‘Who holds the data?’ ‘Who do we need to talk to?’ ‘What software do we need?’
• There is a strong dependency with the Asset Maintenance Planning and Emergency Response NUAR use cases.
Working in partnership with the Geospatial Commission (GC), the Iceberg Industry Group delivered a workshop (Nov 2019) looking at additional applications 
and benefits, (over-and-above strike avoidance), that may be realised by the creation of an underground asset register and better subsurface data use. 
Twelve use cases were reviewed and prioritised by delegates during the workshop. Resilience Planning (including flood risk) was one of the top 5 use cases 
identified. This document, prepared by the British Geological Survey, forms a more detailed review of the Resilience Planning use case and provides 
information on the strategic case for change, economic case and feasibility, along with case studies and user applications. 
I am a government planner in London. 
It’s my job to identify critical and 
vulnerable infrastructure. 
I need to better understand criticality and risk to inform our 
emergency, security and disaster response planning. Flooding and 
terror incidents are a particular concern.
“I need to consider both how natural hazards (e.g. Flood, landslides, 
collapsed ground) and anthropogenic hazards (e.g. Fire, explosion, 
security, terrorist attack) might affect assets located underground. I need 
to consider ‘shocks’ to the system as well as ‘chronic’ stresses.”
“ I am preparing myself and our community…. ”
How can I best evaluate the hazards and risks I need to prepare for? 
How can our community adapt and reduce the impacts of such an event? 
Q. What data do I require in advance? 
✓ Accessible 
✓ Funding/ licence agreements
✓ How can I share this data effectively
Q. How reliable does the data need to be?


























Resilience planning is different to Emergency response: 
An Emergency Response is: “ I am dealing with this now”
Emergency Response Questions: 
What event am I dealing with now? 
How can I get the data I need now? 
How much do I trust my data to make an immediate decision? 
Government planners need to identify critical and 
vulnerable infrastructure assets
• to better understand criticality and risk
• to better inform emergency response planning
• to better inform security decisions
• to better inform disaster response planning
• to better inform climate change adaptation and 
resilience planning
Linking all the above processes is a desire to create 
improved risk assessments. This is currently achieved  
through supported access to environmental data and 
relevant above ground info (land use etc.). 
Underpinning future development in resilience  
planning is easily accessible  access to quality and 
reliable subsurface information such as the NUAR 
platform. 
A resilience plan provides a business, organisation or  community 
with an understanding of policies, programs, or actions that can be 
taken to improve the community’s resilience to a change in 
conditions.
Resilience planning can include: 
• updating datasets
• updating contact information, making sure that the right people 
have access to the right information
• compiling maps (or understanding the collection that is already 
available) 
• the development of standards
• creating incentive programs for collaboration
• Integration of data and systems to identify dependencies to 
understand cascading hazards and potential ‘knock-ons’
• other plans or policies to better prepare for likely shocks and 
stresses to underground assets and infrastructure.  
“How can I improve measures, access information sources that 
might allow for action in the face of uncertainty or unexpected 
events?”
“What can I learn from previous events or situations?” 
“What can I change?” 
“How will this improve resilience of the subsurface  infrastructure 


























What is urban resilience?
“the capacity of individuals, communities, institutions, businesses, and 
systems within a city to survive, adapt, and grow no matter what kinds 
of chronic stresses and acute shocks they experience.”
100 Resilient Cities (2018). What is urban resilience? www.100resilientcities.org/resources/. 
Stresses: chronic, slow-moving 
disasters that threaten the 
fabric of a city. 
Shocks: acute events that 
threaten the city.
What is a resilience plan?
Stresses:







• Hydrological hazards (floods, 
inundation).
• Geohazards (landslides, 
earthquakes)
• Extreme weather (storms, freeze)
• Explosions, blasts, attacks
• Collapse
How does this apply to buried assets?
Links with other NUAR use cases?
Asset maintenance:
Asset owners need to integrate 
underground infrastructure 
location with environmental 
data …To identify environmental 
risks to their assets and mitigate 
the effects.
Emergency response:
Emergency responders need to 
access up to date underground asset 
data live…
To better understand an emergency 
























What other assets are nearby? What else 
could be at risk? Do we have the contacts 
for other asset owners? 
Will any of the assets be damaged in the 
event of an incident? 
Have we considered deterioration of assets over 
longer term? Have we considered the combined 
impacts of Climate Change (long term) and population 
change and technology development on our assets?  
What technology is available or 
could be designed: Data portals? 
Apps for data collection? Alerts and 





more have been 






















































The UK government publishes the National Risk 
Register of Civil Emergencies to provide information 
on risks that could cause serious disruption to lives 
over the next five years.  The National Risk Register 
is based on the National Risk Assessment, a classified 
assessment of risks to the UK. 
Risks to buried assets




• Industrial and urban accidents
• Transport accidents and attacks
• Heatwaves
• Attacks on infrastructure
• System failures





Cast study Example Key issue
Underground fire at Holborn Unseen risks and further missing subsurface  data information for decision making  
Groundwater flooding Subsurface pathways for flood waters accentuated by pipelines and permeable material  
Superstorm Sandy Subsurface flooding of infrastructure, coupled with damage to assets and cables, following 
breach of flood defences
Buncefield Potential for pollution to key waterway increased as not all available data on subsurface 
draining pathways and channels included in local maps
The case studies below are used to help demonstrate pinch points and problems in resilience planning with relation to surface and  
subsurface information and datasets. Whilst resilience planning had taken place enabling a quick emergency response, the examples 
also demonstrate a need to consider future stresses to subsurface assets such as population increase, development and climate change. 

























Key learning points:     
• There are differences between resilience planning for ‘shock events’ and longer-term ‘stresses’. 
• Buncefield Fire demonstrates an incomplete collation of available resources that could be rectified for a future shock.
• Superstorm Sandy and groundwater flooding display a requirement for detailed resilience planning to manage events of a 
similar nature or magnitude in the future; learning from previous issues that good defences can be breached or natural 
exposure can be exacerbated by asset infrastructure.
• There are continued issues with access to reliable data in a reliable format  - not all data included in response if stored in 
different locations.
• The examples demonstrate that the pathways for movement of water, contaminants and gases underground are not fully 
considered.
All case studies demonstrate
• Gaps were exposed in data sources and transfer pathways
• Effect of buried infrastructure and presence of subsurface pathways are not fully considered  
An electrical fault in the Victorian tunnels under 
Holborn, London, caused a fire and mass power 
outages in central London. The electrical fault 
ruptured a nearby gas main fuelled the fire which 
burned underneath the pavement for 36 hours. 
What happened?
On the 1st April 2015 An electrical fault occurred in the Victorian 
tunnels under Holborn, London.  The electrical fault ruptured a nearby 
gas main. This fuelled the fire which burned underneath the 
pavement for 36 hours. 
The fire was running along a three-metre wide tunnel that runs for 
400 metres  between Great Queen Street and Aldwych in central 
London. 
“London fire commissioner Ron Dobson said: "This 
technically difficult fire shows just how complex London 
can be and how unseen risks underneath the capital can 
significantly affect businesses, residents and the day-to-



























How is this related?  
Statistics from the Health and Safety Executive (HSE)  investigating the 
incident, showed there were 40 cases of pavements blowing up or 
catching fire in 2014 alone. 
As the fire burned, London Fire Brigade were able to use the 
Metropolitan Police helicopter and infra-red images to locate where 
the main hot spots were. 
Scotland Yard's explosives robot was used to go into the tunnel to 
provide information.
What were the impacts?
5 000 people were evacuated from nearby homes and business. The 
fire caused traffic restrictions, closed theatres and restaurants and a 
loss of telephone lines. Thousands of properties lost gas and electric 
supplies; 3,000 properties were affected, according to UK Power 
Networks.
Business leaders warned the Holborn fire could cost the capitals 
economy £40 million.  
The service tunnels comprising  >100 year old brick arches
surrounded by concrete envelopes were damaged.
What else is important? 
Response discussions included use of high-expansion foam however 
there was no compartmentation in the tunnels, there was no way of 
knowing where the foam would go and what structural damage it may 
have caused.
Who was involved?
London Fire Service   
Asset Owners






The Oxford floodplain is underlain by permeable 
shallow sands and gravels. In July 2007, during a 
severe flood event,  200 properties were affected by 
flooding from rising groundwater which was either the 
sole cause or the initial cause prior to inundation from 
fluvial waters. 
The EU Floods Directive (2007/60/EC, which came 
into force in November 2007, includes provisions for: 
assessing the risk from groundwater flooding, 
producing groundwater ‘flood hazard maps’ and 



























An estimated 1.6 million properties are at risk of groundwater flooding 
in England and Wales. Oxfordshire has experienced notable flood events 
in recent years. However, some properties suffered from groundwater 
flooding only in Dec 2000 and Jan 2003. Oxfordshire was further hit by 
severe flooding in July 2007 during the wettest summer on record.
Groundwater levels in the area are very shallow and respond rapidly to 
both fluctuations in river level and rainfall. Groundwater flooding is often 
an early indication that more extensive flooding is likely to occur.  
How is this related?  
Where buildings have been constructed  on the flood plain the removal 
of alluvium also provides preferential pathways for upward groundwater 
movement, as do man-made drainage channels. Where the water rises 
above its normal level, these can result in flooded gardens, cause 
drainage problems (e.g. inundation of sewerage systems) and create 
dampness beneath floorboards.
Groundwater can also flood properties in these low-lying areas where 
the ground floor or the inhabited basement is close to the level of the 
natural floodplain. Pre-war properties were usually constructed with 
basements and in time many residents have converted these into living 
areas. Groundwater levels are rising and infiltrating buried assets, making 
the asset part of a ‘natural drainage system’. 
What were the impacts?
In 2007, 1 600 properties were reported as being affected by flooding. 
200 of these identified groundwater as the sole cause or the initial 
cause prior to inundation from fluvial waters. Subsurface pipework 
was reported as a key pathway for flow. The ballast fill surrounding 
underground pipes was noted to provide a high permeability pathway 
for groundwater.
What else is important? 
Sewers are especially vulnerable to groundwater ingress through 
cracks in the access chambers or the pipes themselves. This can have 
a knock on effect on groundwater quality. Groundwater flooding in 
Patcham, Brighton 2000/2001 reportedly cost  £800 000. In 2013/14, 
three water companies spent an additional £80 million responding to 
impacts of groundwater infiltration. Local Site and Monuments 
Records Data and National Schedule Monuments records have shown 
a wealth of historically significant archaeological remains where 






Local residents and businesses
Flood Action Groups
Blue lights
Hurricane Sandy's progression from the 
Caribbean to the U.S. East Coast caused 
deadly flooding, mudslides, and 
destructive winds. As it hit New York 
City, Superstorm Sandy created a storm 
surge.
National Geographic: “Though Sandy is often described as an anomaly, for 
many it was a call to action. The disaster showed how vulnerable wider 
areas of the United States are to extreme weather events, particularly in a 
time when scientists warn that climate change is threatening sea-level 
rise and hotter temperatures. Since the storm, affected regions have 





























On the 24th October 2012 Hurricane Sandy began it’s rampage over the 
Caribbean and continued on a Northwards track for the next 7 days, 
causing devastation along it trail. The ‘Superstorm’ hit New York City on 
29th October 2012. At a Consolidated Edison substation in Manhattan's 
East Village, a shut down plan was in action for the city, and based on 
previous experience and modelling, was protected by a structure for a 
surge of 12.5 feet. The surge experienced was was 14ft, and a gigantic 
wall of water defied the modelled planning design expectations. The 
water swamped underground electrical equipment, car parks and 
underground infrastructure. 
How is this related?  
Power shut down had been as part of the emergency response planned 
for underground equipment in some lower areas of city. National Grid 
had shut down sections of its gas distribution systems in flood-prone 
areas so the storm damage to infrastructure would not be amplified by 
leaking gas. 
Underground wires can flood and be more difficult to repair, especially in 
low-lying areas. It can be harder for workers to get to the wires because 
manholes flood. When water recedes, it can be harder to find problems, 
pull out wires and equipment, dry them, fix them, and slide them back 
into place.
What were the impacts?
Different parts of the city had already been shutdown in phases as the 
storm passed. This was a precaution to try and protect underground 
equipment vulnerable to flooding from corrosive, destructive 
seawater. 
The Surge left 250,000 lower Manhattan customers without power
and pushed flood of seawater into the city, flooding basements, car 
parks and vehicle tunnels, railyards ferry terminals and subway lines. 
Subway stations and  tunnels had to be pumped out. Electrical 
systems had to be cleaned, repaired and tested and in some places 
this  took weeks. 
What else is important? 
National Grid estimated it will need to invest $200 million in 
infrastructure repairs and upgrades in the wake of Superstorm Sandy. 
The worst of the damage to the company’s service area occurred in 
Rockaway Beach and Staten Island where 27 miles of mains had to be 
replaced.
Who was involved?
Local and Federal Government; 
Utility asset owners; Blue lights; 
American Red Cross
Hurricane Sandy Rebuilding Task
Force
Coastal managers
The Buncefield explosion and fire that lasted 3 days. Further 
explosions resulting in 20 storage tanks being overwhelmed 
and 3 days to extinguish. The M1 was closed, and 
contaminants from the foam used to fight the fire,  were 
subsequently found in the groundwater boreholes. 
The Hertfordshire Oil Storage Terminal, 
had a capacity of about 60 million 



























The Hertfordshire Oil Storage Terminal is located in Hemel Hempstead, 
Hertfordshire, England, near the M1. On the 11th of December 2005 a 
broken gauge on a tank failed to alert staff the tank was over filling . 
Eventually large quantities of petrol overflowed from the top of the 
tank. A vapour cloud ignited causing a massive explosion and a fire. 
Further explosions resulting in 20 storage tanks being overwhelmed 
and 3 days to extinguish. 
Air pollution, smoke, and disruption to businesses and personal life as 
a result of the fire were the biggest impacts at surface. Hundreds of 
homes were evacuated affecting about 2,000 people. Windows were 
smashed in the explosion. Public buildings were closed.
How is this related?  
On this occasion, most of the fuel burned out – rather than spilling 
into the soil, so the impact on surrounding land and the water table 
was limited.
However, the adjacent area contained a number of drains and 
soakaways that the site operators had not identified and liquids were 
able to penetrate into the soil beneath them. The HOSL West site had 
drainage and a soakaway that were not featured on current plans but 
were shown on older company plans.
What were the impacts?
Subsurface issues arose from the quantity of water and foam used in 
fighting the fire. In May 2006, Three Valleys Water announced that it 
had detected a persistent, bioaccumulative, and toxic chemical called 
PFOS (fluorosurfactant perfluorooctane sulfonate) in a groundwater 
borehole close to the Buncefield site. This is a chemical used in fire 
fighting foam. No water from this well entered the public water supply 
and a nearby well and pumping station had been closed since the fire 
as a precautionary measure. 
What else is important? 
Post event reports concluded that added safety measures were 
needed for when fuel does escape, mainly to prevent it forming a 
flammable vapour and stop pollutants from poisoning the 
environment. 
Reports highlighted that up-to-date drainage plans for areas on and 
off site should be readily available to emergency responders before 
and during an incident, to include topographical detail for surface 
flows and subsurface drainage features.
Who was involved?
Fire Service 
Health and Safety Executive 
UK Oil pipelines Ltd.
Environment Agency 
Highways Authority
Several Engineering Companies 
Provide solutions that address problems across multiple sectors with 
subsurface assets creating maximum benefit 
✓ Improved prediction methods (e.g. flood modelling, assessment of 
impacts on underground assets)
✓ Integrated risk assessment and ‘live’ risk modelling 
Make good financial investments that have the potential for economic 
benefit to the investor and the broader community 
✓ Include flexible and adaptable measures that consider future 
unknowns of changing climate, economic, and social conditions
✓ Loss of local knowledge in ageing workforce needs collating costing 
time and money 
Integration with other models to evaluate subsurface critical and 
vulnerable infrastructure
✓ Devolution and regional planning response utilising local knowledge 
✓ Better planning response to asset strike  (e.g. accidental works or 
terrorist) 
✓ Linking assets that can affect different hazards (e.g. pathways 
creating unnatural flow channels) 
Better coordination & emergency response, improving speed and effort 
✓ Potential for better and quicker emergency response


























Over reliability on accuracy of data 
* Depth information of buried assets variable or none existent at 
present time 
* Accuracy of spatial information and age of data
* Information on the condition of assets information, potential access 
to subsurface  asset 
Accessibility of data 
* Licence agreements to useful information and data layers
* Storage of sensitive data and inclusion in models
* Ownership and maintained data management on underground 
assets 
Uptake of engagement with wider stakeholders and partners 
* Avoiding Heritage digs causing delays – localised records
* Understanding wider geological/ natural conditions through 
collaboration with correct organizations.
Hazard awareness and relationships with subsurface assets
* Understanding of cascading hazards and contact with important 
stakeholders (e.g. pathways creating unnatural flow channels) 
* Natural resources, geological conditions and climate may move (e.g. 




















































Data hard to access – different 
organisations to liaise with  
Data in different formats, requiring 
different software 
Wide consideration of response 
with different priorities: 
Danger to life, Denial of access, 
Damage to infrastructure
Data incomplete or out of date










































Water, Energy, Transport, Communications
Underpinning future development in critical 
infrastructure resilience  planning is ease of  
access to quality and reliable subsurface
information. 
Resilience Planning for both current and 
emerging potential  shocks and stresses have 
been identified as requiring improved data 
acquisition and with regard to critical 
infrastructure.
Local vs national Risk assessment require 
different levels of information. One data 













Consistent levels and methods of emergency planning for the United Kingdom are set out by the Civil Contingencies Act 2004
The Regulations that accompany the Civil Contingencies Act require that an Local Resilience Forum (LRF) is established in each 
police force area. This is known as a local resilience area.
A Local Resilience Forum (LRF) is not a legal entity, nor does a Forum have powers to direct its members. Nevertheless, the Civil 
Contingencies Act and the Regulations that accompany it provide that responders, through the Forum, have a collective 
responsibility to plan, prepare and communicate in a multiagency environment. Each Forum meets around twice a year. 
Risk assessments enable Local Resilience Forums to highlight the biggest risks within the local resilience area and draw up 
appropriate resilience plans that are proportional to the risks faced. 
The risk assessment process requires co-operation between organisations. 
How can we help support resilience planning with better subsurface data? 
Can we assist and improve organisational links in resilience planning?  
Can we assist access to  subsurface  information at earlier stage?
E.g: A lead Agency is identified for the planning/ risk assessment, depending on the appropriateness and level of responsibility to that 
event: 
Examples related to the waterways: 
A major flooding event   lead agency would be the  Environment Agency 
A major water course pollution event lead agency would be the  Environment Agency 
Fire or explosion which could pollute waterways lead agency would NOT be the Environment Agency  as 




























• Local authorities (county, district, London 
borough etc.) 
• The emergency services (police, fire & 
rescue, ambulance),
• NHS England, Wales, Scotland 
• Public Health England, Wales,
• Port health authorities, 
• Maritime and Coastguard Agency 
• Environment Agency, Scottish 
Environment Protection Agency, Natural 
Resources Wales 
• Armed Forces
Category 2 responders: 
Utilities: 
Electricity distributors and transmitters
Gas distributors
Water and sewerage undertakers
Telephone service providers 
Transport:
Network Rail







The Health and Safety Executive
Voluntary aid societies (VAS)
e.g. St John Ambulance 


























Category 1 Core Responders.
Responders are organisations at the core of the response to most emergencies (the emergency services, local authorities, NHS bodies). 
Category 1 responders are subject to a full set of civil protection duties including planning, arrangement and efficiency of response. 
Category 2 Key co-operating responders that act in support of the Category 1 responders. 
Category 2 organisations (the Health and Safety Executive, transport and utility companies) are ‘co-operating bodies’. They are less likely to 
be involved in the heart of planning work, but will be heavily involved in incidents that affect their own sector. Category 2 responders have a 
lesser set of duties - co-operating and sharing relevant information with other Category 1 and 2 responders.
How much is subsurface 
information actually  
considered by the Category 
1 and 2 responders  in the 
current plans? 
16
3D Datasets; Building information; 
MasterMap;  
Localised systems and data  
Failure of the 
Thames barrier creating a tidal flood risk scenario Current 
(Emergency response) 
Future
(Resilience Planning)  
Historical data 














Data management plans 
Investment Plans








How much is the subsurface considered? 









Stakeholder focus  - ‘Stress’ Example: The Thames Barrier 
• The Thames Barrier can be closed to reduce fluvial flood risk. 
• Climate change will increase the number of closures required to protect against rising tides. 
• With increased and more intense rainfall, fluvial flood risk will increase. 
The Thames Barrier will be less and less available to assist with managing this fluvial flood risk as it will need to be conserved for tidal flood 
risk management – the purpose for which it was designed. 
The particular constraint is the annual number of closures for the Barrier, as this must be limited to reduce the risk of failure and ensure 




















































The UK has significant experience of resilience planning and handling of emergencies both natural and human induced.  Several recent 
research and government-level investigations have highlighted potential gaps in capability, and have instigated policy change and strategic 
groups to address these.
The National Risk Register provides an over view of the key risks that are identified as potential to cause significant disruption to the UK 
(slide 6). Infrastructure is specifically mentioned in regard to  severe weather response (Drought, flooding), space weather, wildfire, system 
failures , Transport, industrial  accidents, public disorder malicious attack. Key in all cases is development of data and information sharing. 
https://www.theccc.org.uk/publication/reducing-emissions-and-preparing-
for-climate-change-2015-progress-report-to-parliament/) 
The independent review by Sir Michael Pitt of the summer 2007 
floods recommended the development of plans to reduce the 
vulnerability of critical national infrastructure to flooding and other 
natural hazards. The review identified no national standard for flood 
resilience for critical national infrastructure assets and suggested that 
as a minimum, critical infrastructure assets should be protected to a 
1-in-200 year standard against flooding. The Cabinet Office has set a 
benchmark that “as a minimum essential services provided by Critical 
National Infrastructure (CNI) in the UK should not be disrupted by a 
flood event with an annual likelihood of 1 in 200 (0.5%)”.  But the 
Committee on Climate Change have warned that “It is not clear how 
this benchmark has been interpreted by each sector and whether this 
minimum standard of flood resilience is now in place”.
Under section 208 of the Water Industry Act 1991 (“WIA 91”), 
Defra’s Secretary of State and the Welsh Ministers can issue general 
or specific directions to water and sewerage undertakers and to 
water supply and/or sewerage licensees in the interests of national 
security or to mitigate the effects of a civil emergency.  The Security 
and Emergency Measures (Water and Sewerage Undertakers) 
Direction 1998 and Security and Emergency Measures (Scottish 
Water) Direction 2002– commonly referred to as SEMD – directs 
undertakers to maintain plans to provide a supply of water at all 
times.
The National Emergency Plan for Downstream Gas & Electricity 
(required under the terms of EU Gas Security of Supply Regulation 
(EU)994/2010) sets out arrangements between government, 
industry, regulator and other parties for safe and effective 
management of downstream gas and electricity supply emergencies.
In relation to emergency planning, response and recovery, the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (CCA) places statutory duties on utilities as Category 2 
responders (as defined by the Act). The duties placed on Category 2 responders include business continuity planning. Government will continue to 
encourage critical infrastructure operators to have business continuity planning to international standards ISO 22301 - ″Societal Security — Business 
continuity management systems — Requirements″ and ISO 22313 - ″Societal Security — Business continuity management systems — Guidance″
Increased collaboration between wider organisation network allows a greater potential and provision of useful data sets that 
infrastructure owners may have previously been unaware of/ not considered applicable to the underground assets of utilities and 
foundations. 
Widespread flooding took place in England in June and July 2007; 55,000 properties flooded, 7,000 rescued and 13 people died. Nearly 
500,000 people were left without water or electricity and the insurance bill reported to be about £3 billion. Sir Michael Pitt was asked to 
carry out an independent review focussing on; flood risk management, the resilience and vulnerability of critical infrastructure, the 
emergency response, emergency planning and the recovery phase. The Pitt Review: Lessons learned from the 2007 floods, was published 
on 25 June 2008. 
https://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20100702215619/http://archive.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/pittreview/thepittreview/final_report.html
The Natural Hazards Partnership, was established in 2011. The 
consortium provides authoritative and consistent information, 
research and analysis on natural hazards for the development of 
more effective policies, communications and services for civil 
contingencies, governments and the responder community across 
the UK.
They provide a timely, common and consistent source of advice to 
government and emergency responders for civil contingencies and 
disaster response. The partnership agreement creates an 




























The Flood Forecasting Centre/ Scottish Flood Forecasting Service are 
jointly staffed by Met Office and Environment Agency/ Scottish 
Environment Protection Agency employees. They are fully operational 
24/7 supporting the Category 1 and 2 emergency response 
community, with Environment Agency or Natural Resources Wales, 
SEPA, flood warnings, and Met Office weather warning services.
This earlier and better communication of flood risk enables national 
and local responders and asset owners  to support local communities 
at risk of flooding. This provides people more time to take action to 





“The availability of required information”
• Improved data sharing for resilience planning will support the Government  drive for better practice and cooperation between operators. 
• Include directives on Water, Energy, Transport and Communications – all including subsurface assets and comments.
• However, there is no single authority for national infrastructure   
Data on the public sewerage system is held 
by Water companies, there are still many 
privately owned sewers. 
“This situation may be improved if the 
proposal for water companies to adopt 
private sewers that feed into the public 
sewerage system goes ahead”. 
Who has the responsibility for gathering the 
information where it is not readily available, as 
this can be resource-intensive;
“Also a need to establish standard methods of 
data-gathering and to ensure consistency in 


























Resilience Programme (CIRP) within Cabinet
Office will be working with relevant Lead
Government Departments to put in place
procedures for assessing the vulnerability of
critical infrastructure to natural hazards, and
to measure the levels of resilience in the
sector. 
Who will own the data if we share it and how 
will users ensure it is the most up to date / 
will it be updated? IPR – Asset owners will 
need reassurance. 
Example: An asset owner is in discussion with local resilience planner reviewing flood assessment models for a new housing estate. 
Critical infrastructure in the local area, is recorded by the asset owner and the developer but they don’t match. Some of the Asset 
owners data is regarding inactive pipeline subsurface structures that could affect flow pathways, however it  is older and buried on a 
standalone machine in the office. 
Water company 
requested to provide 

















No statutory duty on different 
stakeholders to share information. 
No format standards or guidelines. 
No incentive to change established 
working patterns    






for own use 
with cavets
Not fed back to original provider, so is 





























data to the 
organisation. 
Easy transfer 




Future requests for the 
data can be handled easier 
using Asset Register: 





























Arup • Atkins • EDF Energy • Environment Agency • High Speed 2 • HR 
Wallingford • London Underground • National Grid • Network Rail • Scottish 
and Southern Energy (SSE) • Scottish Water • Temple Group • Translink NI • 
Transport Scotland • UKWIR • WSP
https://nerc.ukri.org/innovation/activities/infrastructure/envrisks/eriip-overview/
The Environmental Risks to Infrastructure Innovation Programme (ERIIP) aimed 
to provide sound evidence for the identification and assessment of 
environmental risks and their impacts on infrastructure, translating the latest 
research into industry-relevant outputs.
‘There is a wealth of data, knowledge and expertise in the UK research base 
which could address this challenge but this valuable resource is often difficult to 
access and requires translating to be more readily used.’
Dr Dina D'Ayala
University College London
Groundwater and Flood Risk in the London Rail Infrastructure Network: Building 
Resilience into Existing Masonry Infrastructure Assets 
Arup (Ove Arup and Partners Ltd) (UK), London Underground
Dr Ana Mijic
Imperial College London
Improved techno-economic evaluation of Blue Green Solutions for managing flood 
risk to infrastructure UK AECOM, Environment Agency 
AECOM, Environment Agency 
Dr Christopher Jackson     
British Geological Survey
Assessing the risk of groundwater induced sewer flooding to inform water and 
sewerage company investment planning
Thames Water Utilities Limited 
Dr Simon Jude 
Cranfield University
Vulnerability of proximal infrastructure to sand washout from burst water pipes 
and leaking sewers
Anglian Water Services, BT, Lincolnshire County Council 
Dr Rachel Dearden 
British Geological Survey
Modelling the geological factors in pipe failure for better infrastructure 
management
Yorkshire Water Services Ltd 
Dr Christian Wagner University 
of Nottingham
Towards managing risk from climate change through comprehensive, inclusive and 
resilient UK infrastructure planning




Storm Risk Assessment of Interdependent Infrastructure Networks Arup (UK), Atkins UK, Northern Powergrid, Scottish Water
Professor Jim Hall 
University of Oxford
Multi-Hazard Resilience Estimation and Planning for Interdependent
National Infrastructure Networks









Playing Games to Understand Multiple Hazards and Risk from Climate Change
on Interdependent Infrastructure.
Transport Scotland, Scottish Water, SGN, SEPA, Inverclyde Council, 
National Centre for Resilience, Climate Ready Clyde, Adaptation Scotland
Stephen Krause 
University of Birmingham
Innovative monitoring for contamination of water supply systems Affinity Water, UKWIR, Thames Water, Portsmouth Water, EA



























• Leakage from the water supply network is significant due to aging 
infrastructure. → For Thames Water this is equivalent to ~25% of daily 
supply (641ML/d) since more than half of the mains are >100 yrs old and 
prone to corrosion due to long exposure times. (Likhari et al. 2017)
• Water/Wastewater: Ashton et al. (2009) in their report outlining leakage 
targets in London highlight the serious potential impact that leakage could 
have on the underground transport network and traffic congestion →The 
latter was witnessed at the Brent Cross Flyover when a water main burst 
flooding and closing the North Circular road, a main commuter road into 
Central London (BBC, 2012).
• Aging gas main infrastructure has led the fracture rate to rise from 13 per 
100km in 1977 to approximately 14,5 per 100km in 1999 → The HSE 
(2001) identified 91,000 km of iron gas mains within 30m of buildings at 
risk of failure, leading to the Iron Mains Replacement Program (IMRP) 
(HSE, 2011). Approx. 23,000 fractures and corrosion failures which had led 
to 600 ‘gas in building’ events resulting in the fatalities of 1-2 people/yr
had occurred up to 2001 with most iron pipes being 40-100 years old.
Economic cost of corrosion within the UK the cost of corrosion has been 
estimated to be approx. 4-5% of Gross National Product (GNP) (Uhlig, 1985).
KEY REFERENCE: Pritchard et al., 2013. Soils corrosivity in the UK – impact on critical infrastructure.  Infrastructure Transitions Research Consortium Working paper.
www.itrc.org.uk/wp-content/PDFs/Soil-corrosivity-impacts-UK-infrastructure-report.pdf
Underlying factors
o The gas and water utilities sectors are more greatly affected by corrosion 
issues. Electricity and telecommunication utilities are less affected by 
corrosion.
Leakages and burst from water pipes as a result of corrosion, can lead to 
cascading impacts including:
➢ contamination of underlying soil and groundwater, 
➢ swelling of clay soils e.g. if a water pipe were to develop a leak in a 
clay soil the subsequent wetting could result in the swelling of the 
soil, of up to 10% of original soil volume (Nelson and Miller, 1992),
➢ Loss of support or ground collapse due to washing away of fine soil 
materials or dissolution of soluble rock.
o Ground motion, in particular vertical movement is an underlying factor 
causing damage to buried utilities.  In parts of London vertical motions 
can reach up to 50mm/yr (Boyle et al., 2000).
o Oliff et al. (2001) regard the settlement of soil as both inducing failure 
in older pipelines but also the most common cause of failure in modern 
(plastic) pipelines. 
Insurers have estimated that shrink–swell related subsidence impacts on 
buildings and infrastructure cost the insurance industry over £400 million a 
year (Jones and Terrington, 2011). 
Ground movement causing damage to assets has direct and indirect costs of 
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Water supply network: In 2013/14, three water companies spent an 
additional £80 million responding to impacts of groundwater 
infiltration. (Likhari et al 2017. nora.nerc.ac.uk/id/eprint/519019/)
Funding for flooding: In the price review for the period 2010-2014, 
Ofgem, permitted electricity companies to collect an extra £112 million 
from customers for flooding resilience.
2007 Summer floods: 55,000 properties flooded; £3 Bn paid out by the 
insurance sector. 
• Flooding of the Mythe water treatment works in Gloucestershire led to 
loss of water supplies for 350,000 people for up to 17 days. 
• Repair costs of local and trunk roads were estimated at £40-60m.
• Damage to electricity distribution assets cut off 40,000 people in 
Gloucestershire for 24 hours. 
• In Yorkshire and Humberside 9000 customers were placed on rota 
disconnection (rolling blackouts) for several days.
(Pitt Review, Final Report 2010).
• Utility costs contributed to just over 10% of the total costs (Ciurean et 
al., 2018)
Winter 2015/16: Total economic damage ~£1.6 Bn. The utilities 
(energy and water) sector reported damages at around 7% of the 
total costs of the floods. The costs include: physical damages to 
infrastructure, additional operational costs and welfare damages to 
consumers suffering disruption. (Ciurean et al., 2018). 
61,000 people lost power in Lancaster. (National Risk Register of Civil 
Emergencies, 2017). 
2000/01 Groundwater flooding in Patcham, Brighton cost a reported  
£800 000
Underlying factors
o The National Flood Risk Assessment shows that a sizeable part of our 
important infrastructure and public services are in flood risk areas. This is 
especially so for water-related infrastructure that needs to be near rivers.
o Predicting shallow groundwater levels is difficult. Underground structures 
such as buried pipes act as preferential pathways and drainage routes for 
shallow groundwater flow.  Impermeable land cover and sustainable 
drainage systems complicate infiltration processes.
o Utility and transport infrastructure provides a route for flood water from 
surface to underground environments. E.g. During hurricane Sandy the 
subways were flooded with seawater and all subway tunnels beneath 
rivers flooded.
o Utility and infrastructure flood impact assessments need to take account 
of climate change, mobilisation of contaminants, and the impacts on 
flooding on underground construction costs.









Total costs £3,900 £1,300 £1,600
Comparison of economic costs by flood event by impact category (2015 prices) (£million)


























Buncefield: (Dec 2005) Europe’s largest peacetime fire occurred at 
Buncefield Oil Storage Terminal, resulting in injuries to >40 people. The 
incident, caused by overflowing petrol storage, resulted in a vapour cloud 
which ignited causing a massive explosion and a fire that lasted five days.
→ A system of drains and soakaways (tertiary containment) to ensure that 
liquids could not be released to the environment were inadequately 
designed and maintained and failed as a result. 
→ The effluent treatment plant included soakaways that were not 
identified in the safety reports or emergency plans 
→ Pollutants from fuel and firefighting liquids leaked from the bund, 





HSE investigating the incident, showed there were 40 cases of pavements 
blowing up or catching fire in 2014 alone.
5,000 people were evacuated from nearby homes and business. The fire 
caused traffic restrictions, closed theatres and restaurants and a loss of 
telephone lines. Thousands of properties lost gas and electric supplies; 
3,000 properties were affected, according to UK Power Networks.
Business leaders warned the Holborn fire could cost the capitals economy 
£40 million.  
A gas explosion at Buckstone Road, Edinburgh in 2005 was caused by interacting 
ground conditions. 
→The four inch diameter cast iron gas main had suffered fissure corrosion at its 
base. 
→ Ground instability had played a major role in the failure of the pipe (HSE, 2006). 
→The resultant pipe leak allowed gas to migrate through the permeable soil where 
it collected within the basement of one of the properties in Buckstone Road, which 
finally resulted in an explosion. 
An gas explosion at Bridge Street, Shrewsbury 2010 (Figure 13) prompted an 
investigation by the HSE (2010). It resulted in the destruction of six commercial 
properties in the town centre, luckily with no fatalities. 
→ The sandy-gravel soil type which was identified within the excavated trench 
was deemed to be very aggressive to moderately corrosive. 
→ The sandy-gravel soil type allowed the leaking gas to migrate to the nearby 
commercial properties that probably provided a source of ignition, there was 
no domestic gas supply to any of the affected buildings. 
Mancunian way ‘sinkhole’ collapse: Torrential rain caused a sinkhole to develop 
which lead to serious damage to a 100-yr old sewer beneath the Mancunian Way, 
central Manchester.  The road was closed for 10 months. Temporary sewer pipes 
were installed whilst a full replacement underground sewer pipe was installed by 
United Utilities at a cost of £6.5m
https://www.unitedutilities.com/corporate/newsroom/2016-news-archive/light-
at-the-end-of-the-tunnel-for-mancunian-way/
SWOT – Resilience to Natural Hazard
Strengths:
• Capability in localised risk analysis
• Clear operational criteria 
• Improved cross-industry collaboration via Natural 
Hazards Partnership and Resilience Direct
• Highly skilled modelling sectors (e.g. flood)
• Strong regulation and licence conditions for resilience 
measures
• Momentum of collaboration 
Opportunities:
• A market for resilience data/models exists
• ‘Digital rehearsing’ Digital Twins, scenarios and 
predictions for multi-hazards
• Access to high quality, curated and structured data
• A standard ‘model’/’process’ with a common operating 
agreement
• Re-insurance sector as potential hazard increase
• Ability to promote subsurface information to future 
resilience 
Weaknesses:
• Modelling skills/data not always accessible/used
• Siloed approaches (e.g. geographical/ administrative  
boundaries to data sharing)
• Quality and level of detail of data
• Isolated communications
• Reactionary asset maintenance
• Not all data is free – a licence is needed, have to pay 
upfront but value isn’t realised until later.
• Value of subsurface information not fully researched
Threats:
• Different resilience organisations use different 
ontologies and standards
• Increased hazards under climate change
• IP and security concerns means lack of sharing



























Similar SWOT scenarios for both long term Stresses and Short term Shocks . UKCP18 predicts hotter direr summers and wetter 
winters, with extreme weather increases such as heat waves, stress , drought, storms and flooding. Better access to subsurface 
data will be required for critical asset assessments  and more united data approach is a key aspect.
SWOT – Resilience to Human  Hazards
Strengths:
• Identification of potential strains on infrastructure as a 
result of development (e.g.  Urban Expansion, change in 
usage)  or shock incident  (e.g.  Explosion, blast) 
Localised risk analysis by asset owners 
• Clear operations criteria 
• Cross-industry collaboration now encouraged
• Increase of awareness 
Opportunities:
• Urban development leads to potential for subsurface 
data and information to be in demand.
• Wide communications and energy critical infrastructure 
focus
• Improved modelling and data sharing platforms 
• Improved collaboration requested by Government 
• Requirement for systems based approach (e.g. 
resilience and consequence of event on different local 
assets) 
Weaknesses:
• Siloed approaches (e.g. geographical boundaries to data 
sharing)
• Localised risk analysis by asset owners 
• Quality and level of detail of data
• Isolated communications between different operators
• Complexity in modelling of single point vs cascade 
failure
Threats:
• Different resilience organisations use different 
ontologies and standards
• Formats of data
• IP and security concerns means lack of sharing



























Improved access to Subsurface information will assist response and planning for shocks and stresses as a result of human events.
Uncertainty about expenses of adaptation and  preparedness to event also register. Shared access to subsurface information 
could support financial side of resilience through removal of repetitive sourcing of  common information. Whilst some site 
specific data may be too nuanced for a national register, wider information could have helped background information and event 
planning. 
